



IBM Zurich Research Laboratory

Preventing Injection Vulnerabilities through Context-Sensitive String Evaluation (CSSE)

Tadeusz Pietraszek <pie@zurich.ibm.com>
Chris Vanden Berghe <vbc@zurich.ibm.com>

RAID 2005 Symposium
Seattle, Sept 07, 2005

Outline

- 1. Motivation**
- 2. Injection Vulnerabilities**
- 3. Context-Sensitive String Evaluation (CSSE)**
 - Metadata Assignment
 - Context-Preserving String Operations
 - Context-Sensitive String Evaluation
- 4. Implementation**
 - Implementation Details
 - Experiments & Results
- 5. Discussion and Conclusions**

1. **Motivation**
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions


Motivation: application-level security

■ Shift towards application-level vulnerabilities:

- lack of security training:
 - “everybody can program web applications in PHP”
- lack of security-friendly tooling:
 - use of weakly typed scripting languages

■ Three in OWASP Top Ten [1] are related to injections

- A1: Unvalidated input
- A4: Cross-site scripting (XSS) Flaws
- A6: Injection flaws



1. **Motivation**
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Motivation: our goal

Shift the burden of application-level security from the many application developers to a small team of security-savvy platform developers.

1. Motivation
2. **Injection Vulnerabilities**
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Injection Vulnerabilities: SQL example

- **Programming flaws allowing attacker to manipulate semantics of SQL query by providing input with **syntactic content**.**

- **Example of SQL injection vulnerability:**

```
$query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE email ='" .  
        $email . "'" AND pincode ='" . $pincode;  
$result = mysql_query($query);
```

- **If pincode = "1234 OR 1=1"**
 - Query result becomes independent of pincode and thus **circumvents authentication logic**
- **Defense can be nontrivial and error prone**
 - complex syntax: e.g., comments, multiple queries,
 - database dependent: MySQL vs. MSSQL vs. DB2
 - context-dependent: strings vs. numeric constants

1. Motivation
2. [Injection Vulnerabilities](#)
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Injection Vulnerabilities: types

- **Injections are the major class of application-level vulnerabilities**

Input \ Output	Execute (e.g., shell, XSLT)	Query (e.g., SQL, XPath)	Locate (e.g., URL, path)	Render (e.g., HTML, SVG)	Store (e.g., DB, XML)
Network input (GET/POST)	shell inj. (CAN-2003-0990)	SQL inj. (CVE-2004-0035)	path traversal (CAN-2004-1227)	“phishing” through XSS (CAN-2004-0359)	preparation for n^{th} -order inj.
Direct input (arguments)	command inj. (CAN-2001-0084)	regexp inj.	local path traversal	PostScript inj. (CAN-2003-0204)	
Stored input (DB, XML)		n^{th} -order SQL inj.		XSS (CAN-2002-1493)	preparation for $(n+1)^{\text{th}}$ -ord. inj.

- **Common varieties include:**


- SQL injection
- Cross-site scripting (XSS)
- Shell injection

- **But there are also:**

- XPath injection
- Path traversal
- Server-side includes (SSI)
- ...

1. Motivation
2. **Injection Vulnerabilities**
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Injection Vulnerabilities: root cause



■ Prerequisites for injection vulnerabilities:

- **textual representation** of output expressions (channel mixing)
- **ad-hoc serialization** of output expressions
- user-originating data used in the output expressions

1. Motivation
2. **Injection Vulnerabilities**
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Injection Vulnerabilities: defense techniques

■ Safe ad-hoc serialization:

- Manual input validation (has to be actively used)
- Automated input validation (filters) [3] (makes assumptions about the usage of expressions e.g., SQL statement)
- Perl variable tainting [4] (the programmer has to write a filtering regexp)
- Static analysis [5] (difficult to apply to languages such as PHP)

■ Serialization APIs:

- Prepared statements (SQL)
- Document Object Model (XML) [6]
- Xen (XML and SQL) [7]

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. **CSSE**
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: design goals

Requirements	Safe ad-hoc serialization	Serializ. APIs
Allow for ad-hoc serialization	✓	✗
Require no developer interaction	✗	✗
Work with legacy code	✓	✗
Non error-prone	✗	✓
Performance overhead	✓	✓


1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. **CSSE**
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: what

- CSSE automatically applies the appropriate checks for syntactic content in user-provided input
- Therefore it needs to be able to:
 - distinguish between user- and developer-provided parts of the output expressions
 - (1) Metadata assignment to user-provided input
 - (2) Metadata-preserving string operations
 - determine the appropriate checks on the user-provided parts before the command execution (e.g. SQL command)
 - (3) Context-sensitive string evaluation

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. **CSSE**
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: example



1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. **CSSE**
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: metadata assignment

(1) Metadata Assignment

- metadata describes which string fragments are user-provided and which developer-provided
 - basic assumption: user-provided input is untrusted
 - more fine-grained than Perl tainting (~1 bit/variable)
- interception of all input vectors:
 - network input: e.g., HTTP headers
 - direct input: e.g., environment variables
 - stored input: e.g., DB, XML

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. **CSSE**
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: metadata-preserving string operations

(2) Metadata-Preserving String Operations

- all string operations should be intercepted:
 - preserve and update metadata
 - complexity:
 - quite often trivial: copy metadata (e.g., tolower())
 - often easy: merge metadata (e.g., concat())
 - sometimes more difficult (e.g., regexp matching)

(1) + (2) ability to distinguish between user- and developer-provided fragments at any point in creation of the output expressions

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

CSSE: context-sensitive string evaluation

(3) Context-Sensitive String Evaluation

- all output vectors are intercepted:
 - appropriate validation function for output vector is called
 - validation function will:
 - leverage the metadata to determine untrusted fragments
 - perform limited syntactic analysis of output expression
 - *detect* syntactic content in untrusted fragments (not trivial!)
 - *prevent* by escaping, blocking, removing, ... syntactic content

(1) + (2) + (3) prevention of injection attacks

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. **Implementations**
5. Conclusions

Implementations: PHP prototype

- **Modification of the original PHP platform v 5.0.2**
- **Focus on the network and MySQL DB input and output vectors**
 - metadata framework:
 - configuration options and metadata repository
 - input vectors:
 - network: GET, POST, COOKIE
 - MySQL database query
 - string operations:
 - most commonly used string operations (e.g., concat, expansion)
 - output vectors:
 - echo, print
 - MySQL database query
- **Total lines of source code added: 587**

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. [Implementations](#)
5. Conclusions

Implementations: validation

- **Tested on phpBB, a popular bulletin-board application:**
 - v2.0.x had 12 SQL injection vulnerabilities in BugTraq [8] ...
 - ... of which we managed to reproduce seven (Bugtraq 6634, 9122, 9314, 9942, 9896, 9883, 10722)
- **Example vulnerability (BugTraq 9112):**

```
1 { code }
2 $search_id = (isset($_HTTP_GET_VARS['search_id'])) ? $_HTTP_GET_VARS[ '
   search_id' ] : '';
3 { code }
4   if ( intval($search_id) )
5   {
6     $sql = "SELECT search_array FROM " . SEARCH_TABLE . " WHERE search_id =
       $search_id AND session_id = '". $userdata['session_id'] . "'";
7     if (!($result = $db->sql_query($sql)))
8     { code }
9 { code }
```


1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. **Implementations**
5. Conclusions

Implementations: experimental results

■ Results:

- Self-tests passed (as with unpatched)
- Correct operation of phpBB
- All SQL injections **detected successfully**

■ Overhead:

- Performance overhead (CGI): ~2-10%
 - the number of affected strings is relatively small
 - efficient lookup
- Memory overhead: ~2%
 - storing metadata only for strings containing only one unsafe part

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. [Conclusions](#)

Conclusions?

Requirements	Safe ad-hoc serialization	Serializ. APIs	CSSE
Allow for ad-hoc serialization	✓	✗	✓
Require no developer interaction	✗	✗	✓
Work with legacy code	✓	✗	✓
Non error-prone	✗	✓	✓
Performance overhead	✓	✓	✓

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. [Conclusions](#)

Discussion: false positives/negatives

- **CSSE is an efficient intrusion defense method**
- **We identified three scenarios in which FP/FN can occur:**
 - **Incomplete implementations**
 - not a trivial task, but needs to be done only once
 - **Incorrect implementations**
 - not a trivial task, but can be done by security savvy experts
 - **Invalid basic assumptions**
 - modifying the internal representation of string directly
 - second-order injections with database storage may need special care to handle correctly

1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Conclusions

- A lot of “real ugly” code out there, with a lot of security vulnerabilities - application level security.
- Many different security vulnerabilities (SQL injection, XSS, directory traversal,...) are **injection vulnerabilities**
- **Need something which addresses injection vulnerabilities holistically and works with legacy code.**
- **CSSE adds metadata to variables, defining its origin, which is subsequently updated throughout their lifetime...**
 - metadata assignment
 - context preserving string operations
- ...and evaluated before passing data to a subsystem
 - context sensitive string evaluation


1. Motivation
2. Injection Vulnerabilities
3. CSSE
4. Implementations
5. Conclusions

Conclusions

- **Designed a prototype system for PHP and tested with with a well known application - phpBB**
 - prevented all injections with reasonable performance and memory overhead
- **CSSE is **not platform-specific** – we have a Java implementation with AspectJ.**
- **You can write CSSE for your **favorite platform**.**
- **There are cases, where it won't work, but it is just another layer in defense in depth.**

Thank you!

- **Questions?**



- **Further info:**

- Global Security Analysis Lab @ IBM Research Zurich
<http://www.zurich.ibm.com/csc/infosec/gsal/projects/csse>

- **Contact:**

Tadeusz Pietraszek (pie@zurich.ibm.com)

Chris Vanden Berghe (vbc@zurich.ibm.com)

References

- [1] OWASP, <http://www.owasp.org/documentation/topten.html>
- [2] ICAT, <http://icat.nist.gov/>
- [3] PHP MagicQuotes, <http://www.php.net/>
- [4] Perl tainting, <http://www.perl.com/>
- [5] Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Java Applications with Static Analysis, V. Livshits and M. Lam, Usenix Security '05
- [6] DOM, <http://www.w3.org/DOM/>
- [7] Unifying tables, objects and documents, E. Meijer, W. Schulte, G. Bierman, DP-COOL'03
- [8] BugTraq, Security Focus, <http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/>